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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

JUSTICE TYREL GARCIA,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 46616-2018
TWIN FALLS COUNTY
NO. CR42-18-7482
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Justice Tyrel Garcia pled guilty to trafficking in marijuana weighing one pound or more,
and was sentenced to a unified term of seven years, with three years fixed. He contends the
district court abused its discretion when it imposed this sentence upon him, considering the plea
agreement and the parties' recommendations.
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Statement of Pacts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Garcia was found to be in possession of over seven pounds of marijuana when his
home was searched pursuant to a search warrant. (Conf. Exs., pp.44-52.) He was charged by
Information with trafficking in marijuana weighing five pounds or more. (R., pp.27-29.) He
entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to an
amended charge of trafficking in marijuana weighing one pound or more, and the State agreed to
recommend a unified sentence of six years, with two years fixed. (8/27/18 Tr., p.9, L.20 - p.10,
L.6; R., pp.32-42.) While the plea offer states the sentence is stipulated, counsel for Mr. Garcia
made clear at the change of plea hearing that he intended to recommend a sentence of one year
fixed. (8/27/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.19-22.) The district court confirmed with the prosecutor that the
sentence set forth in the plea offer was not stipulated, and accepted Mr. Garcia's guilty plea.
(8/27/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-14, p.10, Ls.1-9, p.13, Ls.10-17.)
On September 24, 2018, Mr. Garcia allegedly committed a battery against Kyle Skuza, an
off-duty police officer, by "spit[ting] on [him] near the softball fields." (R., pp.61-64.) Counsel
for Mr. Garcia filed a motion to continue sentencing until after Mr. Garcia was tried on the
misdemeanor battery charge. (R., p.53.) The district court held a hearing, and counsel for
Mr. Garcia explained Mr. Garcia intended to contest the battery charge. (10/23/18 Tr., p.4.) 1 The
district court denied the motion. (10/23/18 Tr., p.5.)
At sentencing, the State presented as evidence in aggregation, the testimony of Mr. Skuza
regarding the softball incident. (11/5/18 Tr., p.3, L.25 - p.4, L.2.) Mr. Skuza testified he was
driving his SUV to play a softball game for his team, "Cuff 'Em and Stuff 'Em," when he

1

The transcript of the motion to continue sentencing hearing, held on October 23, 2018, does not
contain line numbers.
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encountered Mr. Garcia driving the wrong way down a one-way road. (Tr., p.5, Ls.16-21, p.9,
Ls.9-15.) Mr. Garcia asked Mr. Skuza to get onto the shoulder, but Mr. Skuza refused, and
instead placed his vehicle in park. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-14.) Mr. Garcia drove past Mr. Skuza and spit
at him, striking his left cheek. (11/5/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.14-16.) Mr. Skuza said he recognized
Mr. Garcia from softball, and knew him from his work as a school resource officer. (11/5/18
Tr., p.5, Ls.4-6, p.6, Ls.22-25.) Mr. Skuza said he "doubt[ed]" Mr. Garcia recognized him.
(11/5/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.7-9.)
The prosecutor said that, because of the new charge, he was not bound by the sentencing
recommendation contained in the plea agreement. (11/5/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.17-25.) Instead of six
years, with two years fixed, he recommended a sentence of seven years, with three years fixed.
(11/5/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.8-14.) Counsel for Mr. Garcia recommended the mandatory minimum of
one year fixed. (11/5/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.21-22.) After defense counsel made his recommendation,
the prosecutor said he was "going to interject" because he had "an issue with what [counsel for
Mr. Garcia] is asking for." (11/5/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.13-14.) He continued:
If the Court looks at the plea agreement, the defense is restricted to asking for two
years fixed. They cannot ask for one year fixed. While the defendant has relieved
the State of maintaining that recommendation, the defendant is not relieved. And
so in making his recommendation here today, Your Honor, the defendant is
violating the terms of the plea agreement once again.

(11/5/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-21.) The district court said its notes indicated the sentence was
stipulated. (11/5/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-6.) Counsel for Mr. Garcia explained otherwise, and the
district court said, "I have what was signed by the defendant in front of me." (11/5/18 Tr., p.18,
Ls.1-3.) The prosecutor then asked the district court to disregard defense counsel's request.
(11/5/18 Tr., p.18, Ls.21-25.) He said it was "clear in the record" and "clear in the plea
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agreement" that Mr. Garcia was bound to ask for no less than two years fixed. (11/5/18 Tr., p.18,
Ls.23-24.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Garcia to a unified term of seven years, with three years
fixed. (11/5/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.23-25.) The judgment of conviction was entered on November 6,
2018, and Mr. Garcia filed a timely notice of appeal on December 14, 2018. (R., pp.66-74, 8286.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Garcia to a unified term of seven
years, with three years fixed?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Garcia To A Unified Term Of
Seven Years, With Three Years Fixed
A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion when it imposed the sentence recommended by the

prosecutor, seven years with three years fixed, and discounted defense counsel's recommended
sentence based on its mistaken recollection of the plea agreement.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v. McIntosh,

160 Idaho 1, 8 (2016). This Court considers whether the trial court: "(1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its
decision by an exercise ofreason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Reach Its Decision By An Exercise Of Reason As It
Discounted The Sentence Recommend By Defense Counsel Based On Its Mistaken
Recollection Of The Plea Agreement
At sentencing, counsel for Mr. Garcia recommended a sentence of one year fixed, which

is the mandatory minimum for trafficking in marijuana weighing one pound or more under Idaho
Code § 37-2732B(a)(l)(B). (11/5/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.21-22.) After defense counsel made this
recommendation, the prosecutor said he was "going to interject" because he had "an issue with
what [counsel for Mr. Garcia] is asking for." (11/5/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.13-14.) He continued:
If the Court looks at the plea agreement, the defense is restricted to asking for two
years fixed. They cannot ask for one year fixed. While the defendant has relieved
the State of maintaining that recommendation, the defendant is not relieved. And
so in making his recommendation here today, Your Honor, the defendant is
violating the terms of the plea agreement once again.

(11/5/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-21.) The district court said its notes indicated the sentence was
stipulated. (11/5/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-6.) Counsel for Mr. Garcia explained otherwise, and the
district court said, "I have what was signed by the defendant in front of me." (11/5/18 Tr., p.18,
Ls.1-3.) The prosecutor then asked the district court to disregard defense counsel's request.
(11/5/18 Tr., p.18, Ls.21-25.) He said it was "clear in the record" and "clear in the plea
agreement" that Mr. Garcia was bound to ask for no less than two years fixed. (11/5/18 Tr., p.18,
Ls.23-24.) The district court apparently discounted Mr. Garcia's request, and sentenced
Mr. Garcia to the sentence recommended by the prosecutor, based on its mistaken recollection of
the plea agreement. (11/5/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.23-25.)
The district court abused its discretion in discounting defense counsel's recommended
sentence because defense counsel made it clear at the change of plea hearing that the sentence set
forth in the plea offer was not stipulated, and that he intended to recommend a sentence of one
year fixed. (8/27/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.19-22.) The district court confirmed with the prosecutor at the
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change of plea hearing that the sentence set forth in the plea offer was not stipulated, and
accepted Mr. Garcia's guilty plea with that understanding. (8/27/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-14, p.10, Ls.19, p.13, Ls.10-17.)
In explaining Mr. Garcia's sentence, the district court recognized the case involved a
significant amount of marijuana and "could have been charged at a higher trafficking level."
(11/5/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-8). The case was, of course, originally charged at a higher trafficking
level, but was amended down by the prosecutor pursuant to a plea agreement. (R., pp.27-29, 3242, 49-51.) This fact alone thus cannot justify the sentence imposed. The district court also said
at sentencing that it was "not particularly taking much account of [the softball battery] incident."
(11/5/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.13-15.) But for that incident, the State would have been bound to
recommend a sentence of six years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.32-42; 11/5/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.1725, p.13, Ls.8-14.)
The district court nonetheless imposed the exact sentence recommended by the
prosecutor, making no mention of the sentence recommended by defense counsel. Mr. Garcia
specifically bargained for the right to recommend a sentence of one year fixed, and his bargain
was all but nullified when the prosecutor asked the district court to disregard the
recommendation. The district court apparently discounted defense counsel's recommendation
based on its mistaken recollection of the plea agreement. The district court's sentencing decision
does not reflect an exercise of reason, and represents an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Garcia respectfully requests that this Court remand this case to the district court for a
new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 22 nd day of July, 2019.

Isl Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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